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A SURVEY OF THE CURRENT LITERATURE 
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JANUARY 31, 2014 
ABSTRACT 
Many have suggested that the de facto governmental policy of “too big 
to fail” is one of the causes of the severity of the 2008 Financial Crisis in 
the United States.  One of the express purposes of the Dodd-Frank financial 
market reform legislation of 2010 was “to end ‘too big to fail.’”  The Dodd-
Frank Act attempts to address “too big to fail” by expanding the regulatory 
reach to non-bank systemically-important institutions, by creating an 
“orderly liquidation authority,” and by limiting the authority of regulatory 
bodies that give loans to failing banks. 
However, the Act is incomplete.  Even with these instruments, 
economic conditions continue to exist where large banks receive discounted 
rates for their funds, because market participants continue to perceive their 
loans and equity as less risky because they remain “too big to fail.”  
Additionally, Dodd-Frank’s enhanced prudential standards rely heavily on 
stronger capital requirements, and large banks can devise strategies that 
comply with these requirements despite the risk.  To find out what is 
missing from Dodd-Frank, this article surveys the existing literature to 
discover a number of alternative approaches to ending “too big to fail.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 Financial Crisis caused significant economic damage to the 
United States.1  In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act2 (Dodd-Frank) in order to prevent 
another crisis.  In part of Dodd-Frank, Congress tries to end the de facto 
policy of “too big to fail” (TBTF), which was seen by many as a key cause 
of the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
Ever since the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company 
crisis3 in 1984, the U.S. federal government was seen to be willing to step in 
to support a bank or other financial institution that was close to failing if 
that institution was systemically important.  In the 2008 Financial Crisis, we 
saw the TBTF policy play out.  While the Administration did allow Lehman 
Brothers to fail, the U.S. government did step in directly to support a 
number of “systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs).  The 
Federal Reserve helped support JP Morgan Chase’s acquisition of Bear 
Stearns.  It also “approv[ed] Goldman Sachs’ and Morgan Stanley’s 
applications to become bank holding companies eligible for discount 
window borrowing.”4  The government also took extraordinary steps to 
ensure Merrill Lynch’s survival when it “threatened to fire Bank of 
America’s management and board if the company attempted to terminate 
the deal”5 to merge Merrill Lynch into Bank of America.  Additionally, the 
government provided directly $125 billion in capital to support Citigroup, 
Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Goldman 
Sachs, and others.6 
In Dodd-Frank, Congress took a number of steps to end the TBTF 
 
 1.  For reviews, see for example, VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET: 
THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE (2010); FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSE OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. ANDREW 
ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON 
FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM – AND THEMSELVES (2009). 
 2.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
 3.  Continental Illinois was in danger of failing, and its failure would have had significant 
impacts on the thousands of other banks that had funds invested with it.  Consequently, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) stepped in and “rescued” the bank.  See FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE 80S: VOL. I, AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISIS OF 
THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S (1997); See also CHAPTER 7: CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS AND “TOO 
BIG TO FAIL,” http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf. 
 4.  Jeffrey R. Shafer, Five Years Later: Lessons from the Financial Crisis (2013), 
http://media.mhfi.com/documents/Five-Years-Later-Paper-by-Jeff-Shafer1.pdf, at 32. 
 5.  Robert J. Rhee, Case Study of the Bank of America and Merrill Lynch Merger (2010), 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1939&context=fac_pubs, at 
1. 
 6.  Id. at 4. 
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policy.7  However, a number of scholars have explained how Dodd-Frank is 
a “Flawed and Inadequate Response”8 to TBTF.  Consequently, these 
scholars have suggested a number of additional steps be taken.  In the rest 
of this article, we will first review the instruments Dodd-Frank provides to 
address TBTF.  Then, we will examine the critiques offered showing that 
Dodd-Frank does not sufficiently address TBTF.  Finally, to see what is 
missing in Dodd-Frank, we will review the alternatives suggested by the 
existing literature. 
DODD-FRANK’S APPROACH TO END “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” 
Dodd-Frank was designed to address a number of the failures that had 
led to the 2008 Financial Crisis.  One of the express purposes of Dodd-
Frank, according to its preamble, was “to end ‘too big to fail.’”9  In order to 
end TBTF, one of Dodd-Frank’s key components is its establishment of the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).10  One of its most important 
tasks is to identify SIFIs.11  Doff-Frank itself “effectively designates all 
commercial banking groups with $50 billion or more in assets as SIFIs.”12  
The FSOC can also designate non-banks as SIFIs. 
Once designated as a SIFI, such an institution will then “be supervised 
more closely and potentially required to operate with greater safety 
margins, such as higher levels of capital, and to face further limitations on 
their activities.”13  Section 171 of Dodd-Frank (the “Collins Amendment”)14 
specifically “imposes, over time, heightened leverage and risk-based capital 
standards on systemically important financial institutions. . . and will affect 
nonbank financial companies most profoundly because many are currently 
not subject to leverage or risk-based capital standards of any kind.”15  
Additionally, Dodd-Frank allows the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) “to 
apply enhanced supervisory requirements to SIFIs.”16 
 
 7.  Dodd-Frank, supra note 1 at §I (for more description of Dodd-Frank’s approach to 
TBTF). 
 8.  Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the 
Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 963 (2011). 
 9.  Dodd-Frank, supra note 2, at pmbl. 
 10.  The FSOC is composed of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller of the 
Currency, and the Chairs of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission, and other members. 
 11.  Douglas J. Elliott, Regulating Systemically Important Financial Institutions That Are Not 
Banks, BROOKINGS INST. (2013), at 1, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/ 
2013/05/09-regulating-financial-institutions-elliott/09-regulating-financial-institutions-elliott.pdf. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2010). 
 15.  Rob Tammero, Reigning in Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 30 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 595, 599 (2011), http://www.bu.edu/rbfl/files/2013/09/ReigningInFinancia 
lInstitutions.pdf. 
 16.  Wilmarth, supra note, at 955. 
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Another key component of Dodd-Frank is the establishment of the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA).  This authority “should provide a 
superior alternative to the choice of ‘bailout or bankruptcy’ that federal 
regulators confronted when they dealt with failing SIFIs during the 
financial crisis.”17  The OLA is “modeled on the FDIC process that 
successfully took deposit-taking banks like Washington Mutual that failed 
during the crisis into receivership and restructured them without significant 
disruption to the broader financial system.”18  To aid in this process, SIFIs 
are required to develop “resolution plans” (also known as “living wills”) 
that would improve the chances of a rapid dissolution of the institution.19  
The idea here is that by “giving the government a credible tool to wind 
down large, highly leveraged, and substantially interconnected financial 
firms,”20 it should reduce the perceptions that certain financial institutions 
are TBTF. 
Moreover, Dodd-Frank “drastically limits”21 the ability of the Federal 
Reserve and the FDIC to make emergency loans to SIFIs that are failing.  
Dodd-Frank “require[s] the Federal Reserve to consult with and receive 
approval from the Secretary of the Treasury to ensure that any emergency 
lending is designed to provide liquidity to the markets and not to aid a 
financially failing firm . . . [while] the FDIC is authorized to make short-
term loans to solvent depository institutions subject to Congressional 
approval.”22  Loans would be available in liquidation however.23 
These components of Dodd-Frank are designed to end TBTF.  
Designating institutions as SIFIs, and then regulating them more 
extensively including higher capital requirements should reduce the 
likelihood that these SIFIs would fail.  Meanwhile, creating a better 
liquidation process would mean that failure of any one SIFI could be 
handled without having the failure spread to other parts of the financial 
system.  And finally, significantly reducing the opportunities for emergency 
lending would mean that SIFIs should realize that the government would 
not necessarily be stepping in to alleviate their liquidity problems until after 
they “failed,” and so they should have a stronger incentive to prospectively 
 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Steven J. Markovich, The Dodd-Frank Act (2013),  
http://www.cfr.org/united-states/dodd-frank-act/p28735. 
 19.  Dodd-Frank, supra note 2, at § 5325(b)(1)(D).  See also BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, RESOLUTION PLANS (2014),  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm. 
 20.  Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 
100 (2012). 
 21.  Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical 
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1406 n. 229 (2011).  See also Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and Responsibility Failure, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1781, 1818-19 (2013). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
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manage liquidity so that they would not be in danger of failing.  However, 
despite these improvements,24 for many reasons, TBTF remains a problem 
for the U.S. financial system. 
CRITICISMS OF DODD-FRANK’S APPROACH TO TBTF 
A number of scholars have criticized Dodd-Frank’s approach to ending 
TBTF.  Steven Ramirez argues that just as with the Maginot Line in post-
World War I France, Dodd-Frank is designed to fight the battles of the last 
war.  He argues that while Dodd-Frank “will likely foreclose a subprime 
mortgage crisis like the one that nearly crashed global capitalism in the fall 
of 2008. . . it will prove unable to prevent a future, more serious debt crisis.  
Indeed, it may render such a crisis more likely by transforming implicit 
guarantees for megabanks into explicit guarantees.”25  This is because “the 
largest American banks continue to benefit from government subsidies 
under the too-big-to-fail legal construct that permits banks to privatize gains 
and socialize losses.”26 
Many have noted that an implied subsidy to SIFIs remains even after 
Dodd-Frank.27  An empirical study conducted by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) finds that “SIFIs receive transfers when governments are 
forced into bailouts. Ex ante, the bailout expectation lowers daily funding 
costs. This funding cost differential reflects both the structural level of the 
government support and the time-varying market valuation for such a 
support.”28  Moreover, they estimate that this subsidy has actually 
“increased” after the crisis.29 
 
 24.  See Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After 
a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2011) (arguing that while the “Dodd-Frank Act and 
the regulations to follow will not end financial crises forever . . . if the regulations are largely well 
done, they may postpone the next big crisis and make it both shorter and less severe when it does 
occur. Additionally, the Act may do so without imposing too great of a burden on positive 
financial innovation and economic growth.” Id. at 6.). 
 25.  Steven A. Ramirez, Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 109, 109-110 
(2011). 
 26.  Id. at 110. 
 27.  See Dean Baker & Travis McArthur, The Value of the “Too Big to Fail” Big Bank 
Subsidy, Ctr. for Econ. & Policy Research (Sept. 2009), http://www.cepr.net/documents/public 
ations/too-big-to-fail-2009-09.pdf (calculating that the subsidy for large banks was $34 billion a 
year. Id. at 2.); Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 
64 SMU. L. REV. 1243 (2011); and John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: 
Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 795, 800 (2011) (noting that “the market may still consider some banks protected, and 
hence, the ‘too big to fail’ subsidy would not have been effectively ended.” Id.). 
 28.  Kenichi Ueda and Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions 1 (Int. Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/128, 
2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12128.pdf. 
 29.  Id. However, a different study by Goldman Sachs disputes this finding. See Global 
Markets Institute, Measuring the ‘Too Big to Fail’ Effect on Bond Pricing (2013) (unpublished 
report), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-policy/regulatory-reform/measuring-
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Similarly, for a number of reasons, Arthur Wilmarth concludes, “Dodd-
Frank’s provisions fall far short of the changes that would be needed to 
prevent future taxpayer-financed bailouts and to remove other public 
subsidies for TBTF institutions.”30  One of the reasons that he points to is 
that ratings agencies give boosts to TBTF banks.  After statements made 
before stress tests on nineteen bank holding companies suggested that the 
“federal government would provide any capital needed to ensure the 
survival of those institutions,”31 both Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s 
gave rating upgrades to the largest of the banks:  “Moody’s gave . . . ratings 
upgrades for deposits and senior debt issued by the six largest U.S. banks, 
based on Moody’s expectation of ‘a very high probability of systemic 
support’ for such banks from the U.S. government, . . . [while] S&P, the 
other leading CRA, ‘gave Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley ratings upgrades of three notches, four notches, two 
notches and three notches, respectively, because of their presumed access to 
governmental assistance.’”32  With these ratings boosts, these banks have 
access to credit at lower rates, and thus, the expectation that these banks 
remain TBTF provides an implicit subsidy to their cost of raising capital.33 
Another reason pointed out by Wilmarth is that “Dodd-Frank subjects 
SIFIs to consolidated supervision and enhanced prudential standards, but 
those provisions are not likely to prevent future bailouts.”34  This is partly 
because “Dodd-Frank relies heavily on the concept of stronger capital 
requirements, [and] . . . capital-based regulation has repeatedly failed in the 
past.”35  Also, SIFIs “have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to engage 
in ‘regulatory capital arbitrage’ in order to weaken the effectiveness of 
capital requirements.”36  These reasons are consistent with arguments on the 
limitations of capital regulations and prudential standards made by this 
author in a previous article on hedge funds:  Why we Need a Superfund for 
Hedge Funds.37  In that article, I noted, “Specific reserve and margin 
requirements would reduce the amount of leverage that a hedge fund can 
undertake.  However, unless the specific requirements are connected to 
levels of liquidity risk, these requirements will not directly address liquidity 
risk.”38  Furthermore, prudential standards would likely be an ineffective 
 
tbtf.html. 
 30.  Wilmarth, supra note, at 954. 
 31.  Id. at 983. 
 32.  Id. at 983-4 (quoting Governmental Rescues of “Too-Big-to-Fail” Financial Institutions 
12 (2010) (unpublished preliminary staff report) (Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n)). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 1006. 
 35.  Id. at 1009-10. 
 36.  Id. at 1010. 
 37.  Dale B. Thompson, Why We Need a Superfund for Hedge Funds, 79 MISS. L. J. 995 
(2010). 
 38.  Id. at 1023. 
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control on SIFIs because “it is unlikely that any [command and control] 
regulatory system would be able to keep up with the rapidly changing 
strategies of”39 the financial sector. 
ALTERNATIVES OFFERED IN THE CURRENT LITERATURE 
We have seen that Dodd-Frank, while it makes many improvements, 
does not fully address the problem of TBTF.  So what should we do?  Many 
have argued that we should use a structural solution.  Nobel Laureate 
Joseph Stiglitz suggests, “There is an obvious solution to the too-big-to-fail 
banks:  break them up.  If they are too big to fail, they are too big to 
exist.”40  Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan similarly 
concludes, “‘If they’re too big to fail, they’re too big . . .  In 1911 we broke 
up Standard Oil—what happened? The individual parts became more 
valuable than the whole. Maybe that’s what we need to do.’”41  Simon 
Johnson and James Kwak suggest that we should put a cap on the size of 
SIFIs: banks should be no larger than four percent of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), while securities firms should be no larger than two 
percent.42  On the other hand, Peter Wallison suggests that careful, cost-
benefit analysis should be done before considering any break-up, enabling 
us to better identify the optimal cap on the size of SIFIs: 
Breaking up the biggest banks would obviously have profound 
consequences for the US economy, but many who support the idea seem not 
to have given any serious thought to whether the benefits of a breakup 
exceed the associated costs.  Even simpler questions — how small, for 
example, a bank would have to be before it is no longer considered TBTF 
— have been ignored. It is somewhat shocking that so many people who 
should know better have announced their support for the breakup idea 
without addressing this and other fundamental questions.43 
 
 39.  Id. at 1024. 
 40.  JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 164–65 (2010). 
 41.  Michael McKee & Scott Lanman, Greenspan Says U.S. Should Consider Breaking Up 
Large Banks, BLOOMBERG (October 15, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
email_en&sid=aJ8HPmNUfchg. 
 42.  SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND 
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 214-15 (2010). ( use of this standard would require the break-
up of Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan 
Stanley.  Id. at 217.); See also Charles W. Murdock, The Big Banks: Background, Deregulation, 
Financial Innovation, and “Too Big To Fail,” 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 505 (2012) (arguing that “the 
simplest and surest way to deal with the oversized institutions that are not only too big to fail, but 
also too big and complex to manage, is to impose objective size limits of the sort suggested by 
Johnson and Kwak and give management a fixed period of time to come into compliance.”  Id. at 
551.). 
 43.  Peter J. Wallison, Breaking Up the Big Banks: Is Anybody Thinking?, AMERICAN 
ENTERPRISE INST. (Sept. 18, 2012),  
http://www.aei.org/outlook/economics/financial-services/banking/breaking-up-the-big-banks-is-
anybody-thinking/. 
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Others have suggested changes in corporate governance and finance.  
Lawrence Baxter argues that “big banks should bear a greater degree of 
public accountability by reforming certain principles of corporate 
governance to require greater representation of public interests at the board 
and executive levels of big banks.”44  Meanwhile, Nizan Geslevich Packin 
suggests using behavioral economics to come up with better rules and 
structures for risk committees that are in charge of overseeing the risk 
management practices of SIFIs.45  Packin notes that “Traditional economic 
tools are not enough to fight the deeply rooted and undesirable cultural-
institutional attitudes and behavioral effects toward excessive risk-taking.”46  
And so he instead recommends the use of “behavioral economics-based 
guidelines regarding risk committees’ composition, obligation 
requirements, and working procedure.”47 
Also, Peter Conti-Brown suggests reforming SIFIs’ corporate status to 
offer the choice of “elective shareholder liability.”48  If an individual SIFI 
did not “change [its] capital structure to include dramatically less debt,” 
then the SIFI would be required to “add a bailout exception to their bank’s 
limited-shareholder-liability status, thus requiring shareholders - not 
taxpayers - to cover the ultimate costs of the bank’s failure.”49 
A different approach is through what is known as “contingent capital.”  
Contingent capital is a debt instrument that becomes instead an equity 
instrument when certain contingencies – such as a financial crisis – occur.  
John Coffee argues that contingent capital is the best approach because, 
“Properly designed, contingent capital . . . not only can [] prevent the fall of 
the first interconnected domino . . ., but it also protects against the danger 
that systemically significant financial institutions may face highly 
correlated risks.”50  Arthur Wilmarth also suggests using contingent capital 
to address TBTF, particularly “if it is used to compensate senior managers 
and other key employees.”51  Wulf Kaal likewise notes the advantages from 
using contingent capital to “lower their risk taking on behalf of the financial 
institution,”52 although he does note some situations where contingent 
capital could lead to higher risk-taking.53 
 
 44.  Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large 
Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765, 765 
 45.  Nizan Geslevich Packin, It’s (Not) All About the Money: Using Behavioral Economics to 
Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 15U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419 (2013). 
 46.  Id. at 425-426. 
 47.  Id. at 481. 
 48.  Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 409 (2012). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Coffee, supra note 27, at 806. 
 51.  Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail 
Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 707, 760-61 (2010). 
 52.  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in 
Corporate Governance, 26 N.D. J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’ 281, 297 (2012). 
 53.  Id. at 311 (stating that “SIFIs are often considered too big to fail and may be bailed out. 
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The last set of alternative recommendations for addressing TBTF is 
through the use of taxes and insurance funds.  Overly risky behavior by 
financial institutions can generate negative externalities,54 because the costs 
of their possible failure may spread to others, as what happened in the 2008 
Financial Crisis.  In the case of the environment, one approach to deal with 
negative externalities is through a Pigouvian tax55 that forces firms to 
internalize the negative externality.56  Similarly, a number of scholars have 
recommended using a tax to address the negative externalities generated by 
financial institutions.  In “Why We Need a Superfund for Hedge Funds,” 
this author proposed a liquidity tax on hedge funds, based on their portfolio 
choices.57  Similarly, Iman Anabtawi and Steven Schwarcz note that a tax 
based on the systemic risks imposed by a firm can “induce firms to manage 
risk with the interests of the financial system in mind [by] causing them to 
take into account the systemic importance of their activities.”58 
Many have proposed connecting a tax with an “insurance” fund for 
taking corrective action. A report issued by the International Monetary 
Fund in 2010 suggested imposition of a “‘Financial Stability Contribution’ 
(FSC) linked to a credible and effective resolution mechanism.  The main 
component of the FSC would be a levy to pay for the fiscal cost of any 
future government support to the sector.  . . . The FSC would be . . . refined 
thereafter to reflect individual institutions’ riskiness and contributions to 
systemic risk.”59  Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Muller “propose the 
creation of a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund . . . [which] should be 
funded . . . by risk-adjusted assessments on all large financial firms—
including hedge funds—that benefit from systemic stability.”60  Likewise, 
to counteract TBTF subsidies, Arthur Wilmarth argues that the Orderly 
Liquidation Fund under Dodd-Frank should be funded by “risk-based 
insurance premiums,”61 which would essentially act as a “bank tax.” 
A related suggestion comes from Saule Omarova, who “advocates a 
 
If that is the case, SIFI leaders may anticipate a bail-out commitment and may be incentivized to 
shift their risk preferences upwards. If the SIFI has issued CCS, decision makers in SIFIs could 
shift their risk preferences towards even higher risk profiles.”). 
 54.  A negative externality occurs when a firm’s behavior generates a cost that is not imposed 
on itself but is instead imposed on others. 
 55.  See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). 
 56.  By imposing the tax, the firm must now bear its cost rather than imposing it on others.  
This cost is now internalized. 
 57.  See Thompson, supra note 37. 
 58.  Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note, at 1402. 
 59.  INT’L MONETARY FUND, A FAIR AND SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION BY THE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR: FINAL REPORT FOR THE G-20, at 5 (2010),  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf. Note: the “Financial Stability Contribution” 
is frequently referred to as a “bank tax.” 
 60.  Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s 
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG.151, 151 
(2011). 
 61.  Wilmarth, supra note, at 1020. 
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fundamentally new self-regulatory regime in the financial sector, which 
would focus explicitly on the issue of systemic risk prevention and impose 
the responsibility of protecting the public from financial crises directly on 
the financial services industry.”62  This would be done through a 
“mandatory system of mutual self-insurance.”63  However, noting several 
criticisms of an insurance fund approach,64 including a concern that “a 
private insurance fund would be large enough to deal with a true systemic 
crisis,”65 John Coffee suggests that “a private bailout fund may be part of 
the answer, but it cannot be the entire answer.”66 
Thus, the existing literature recommends a wide array of approaches to 
address TBTF.  Some of these are completely internal to the SIFI firms.  
Requiring representation of the “public interest” on SIFI boards and 
creating a “public interest” ombudsman as a SIFI executive would mean 
that bank decisions that might overly increase liquidity and systemic risks 
would face internal scrutiny.  This scrutiny would hopefully prevent the 
accumulation of risks that could overwhelm the ability of the SIFI’s 
reserves to cushion it from external loss shocks.  Similar benefits would 
flow from properly designed risk committees.  These internal controls 
would therefore reduce the possibility that a bank would fail, thereby 
eliminating the need for a government bailout. 
Similar effects arise from the adoption of market instruments calculated 
based on liquidity and systemic risks.  A tax on systemic risk would provide 
an incentive for all SIFI board members and executives – not just those 
designated for the “public interest” – to take steps to alleviate excessive 
systemic risk.  Similar incentives for all board members and executives 
result from the adoption of mutual self-insurance, where the industry itself 
will impose higher insurance premia on SIFI activities that generate 
excessive liquidity and systemic risks.  Both of these approaches therefore 
create internal incentives to significantly reduce the possibility of failure by 
a SIFI. 
Meanwhile, breaking up SIFIs and the use of contingent capital would 
result in circumstances where, even in the event of the failure of one of 
these institutions, no government bailout would be needed.  Breaking up 
SIFIs would reduce their systemic importance, so that their failure would 
have a lower impact on the national economy.  This smaller impact would 
eliminate the impetus to conduct a government bailout.  As a result, 
counterparties of these institutions would have new incentives to more 
closely monitor the liquidity risks posed by these institutions in their 
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investment portfolios. 
Similarly, widespread use of contingent capital would mean that, in the 
event that one of these contingencies were triggered, an internal “private 
bailout network” would be formed.  Loan counterparties of the 
contingency-triggered SIFI would see their claims on that SIFI converted 
into equity.  This would mean that the SIFI would no longer be obligated to 
raise additional capital to meet its debt payments.  Instead, the network of 
loan counterparties would become a new network of equity holders in the 
SIFI.  This private network of equity holders would thereby spread the risks 
of the failure of the individual SIFI, enabling the broader financial sector to 
absorb the losses without the need for governmental intervention.  
Recognizing this future, contingent capital owners would also have 
incentives to more closely monitor the liquidity risks of SIFIs. 
CONCLUSION 
The literature provides a portfolio of options for addressing TBTF that 
are all missing from Dodd-Frank.  Dodd-Frank does attempt to address 
TBTF through enhanced reserve requirements, by the creation of an Orderly 
Liquidation Authority and Fund, and enhanced regulation of both bank and 
non-bank SIFIs, as identified by the Financial Stability Oversight Council.  
Despite these improvements, there still is an expectation of systemic 
support by many, including rating agencies.67  Additionally, implied 
subsidies to SIFIs remain due to their continuing status as TBTF. 
In the face of the continuing problem of TBTF, scholars have offered a 
number of alternatives.  Some, such as increased public interest 
representation and the reform of risk committees, attempt to directly change 
the internal decision-making of SIFIs to lower their risks.  Similarly, a 
systemic risk tax provides financial incentives for SIFIs to do this.  
Meanwhile, structural alternatives such as breaking SIFIs up should lessen 
the need for any government bailout.  Also, the greater use of contingent 
capital would create a private network for spreading the risk of failure by a 
SIFI.  Both of these would incentivize counterparties to more closely 
monitor the financial institution. 
What this review tells us is that Dodd-Frank seems to be missing two 
things.  One is a mechanism for more significantly reducing the incentives 
for SIFIs to take excessive liquidity and systemic risks.  The other is a more 
credible mechanism for eliminating the need for a government bailout in the 
event of the failure of a SIFI.  Additional research could use this review to 
point the way to a more complete design to fully address TBTF. 
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